Modified Autonomous Key Management Scheme with Reduced Communication/Computation Costs in MANET by Lin, Chu-Hsing et al.
Computing and Informatics, Vol. 30, 2011, 1167–1180





Department of Computer Science, Tunghai University
181, Section 3, Taichung Port Road
Taichung 40704, Taiwan
e-mail: chlin@thu.edu.tw
Chen-Yu Lee, Deng-Jyi Chen




Abstract. The growing applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have
made related security issues much more important. B. Zhu et al. proposed a key
management scheme using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to construct an Au-
tonomous Key Management (AKM) hierarchy structure. However, Shamir’s secret
sharing in AKM to control key hierarchy incurs high message transmission costs.
This paper modifies the secret sharing scheme and applies it to AKM to reduce
communication and computation costs.
Keywords: Mobile ad hoc network, key management, autonomous key manage-
ment
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1 INTRODUCTION
Key management within a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a security issue that
cannot be ignored. Many researchers have dedicated themselves to this field since
1999. Some schemes are suitable for a limited number of nodes and are inefficient,
insecure, or unreliable when the nodes increase [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
Nodes may join the MANET and leave later normally. Thus, the key management
scheme in MANET must be dynamic. The main challenge of MANET is that each
node handles the joining or leaving of nodes with the limited resources, such as CPU
computation, storage, and the power consumption [13]. The mobility of a MANET
increases its unreliability and limits the bandwidth of wireless environment due to
frequent topology changes.
B. Zhu et al. proposed a key management scheme [14] using the secret sharing
method [15, 16, 17, 18] to construct an AKM hierarchy structure with flexibility and
adaptivity. This scheme needs no central party to control the key structure, and each
node cooperates to create virtual nodes in building the key hierarchy. The method
proposed in [19] dynamic group key management schemes with forward secrecy and
backward secrecy based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [20], forming a self-
certified public key cryptosystem [21].
However, a message of 2 048 bits would make computing or calculating AKM
communication difficult. Thus, this study modifies the design of each operation in
the AKM scheme. Section 2 briefly introduces Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and
AKM key management. Section 3 describes the modified AKM, which reduces the
share size with the same security properties. Section 4 discusses the performance
improvement compared with the original AKM. Results indicate improved perfor-





2.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
Let t, n be positive integers, t ≤ n. Shamir proposed a (t, n)-threshold scheme in
1979 [15]. His scheme is a method of sharing a key K among a set of n participants
in such a way that any t participants can compute the value of key K, but no group
of t− 1 participants can do so.
2.1.1 The Shamir (t, n)-Threshold Scheme in Zp
D (the dealer) chooses n distinct, nonzero elements of Zp, denoted xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where p > n is a large prime. D gives the values xi to Pi, and each value xi is public.
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2.1.2 Share Distribution
1. Suppose D wants to share a key K ∈ Zp. D secretly chooses (independently
and randomly) t− 1 elements of Zp, a1, . . . , at−1.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D computes yi = a(xi), where













3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D gives the share yi to Pi.
2.1.3 Proactive Security
It is difficult to compromise the secret keyK under (t, n)-threshold scheme unless the
adversary collects at least t shares. In practice, since each share exists in a machine,
the risk of the secret key being compromised depends on the security of machine.
For security concerns, it is necessary to update each share for a period of time.
A proactive threshold scheme allows users to refresh shares without disclosing the
secret key.
1. Let






i ) mod p
be the original share of key K for Pi.









i ) mod p.
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D gives the share y′i to Pi.
4. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Pi computes (yi + y
′
i) as a new share.
2.2 Autonomous Key Management (AKM)
Autonomous key management (AKM) for a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) with
a large number of nodes is based on a hierarchical structure to provide flexibility
and adaptivity. Every leaf node in the logical tree structure is a real ad hoc device,
and the other nodes are virtual nodes. The root node holds the global secret key,
and AKM distributes key shares to its children recursively from the root down to
the leaves using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
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Every node except the AKM root node must store its own public key pair and its
parent node secret share. The secret share each virtual branch node holds is as the
secret key, and the public key can be generated using any asymmetric cryptographic
scheme, such as RSA. Additionally, every real node has its PKI key pair before
joining AKM.
A tree with node A as its root is called region A. AKM includes seven node-
based/region-based operations from node joining, region partitioning, to node leav-






Secret1,1 Secret1,2 Secret1,3 Secret2,1 Secret2,2 Secret2,3 Secret2,4
[3, 2] [4, 3]
[2, 2]
: Virtual Node : Real Node
C1,1 C1,2 C1,3 C2,1 C2,2 C2,3 C2,4
Fig. 1. Example of AKM
3 MODIFIED AKM
This section modifies the secret sharing of AKM. AKM runs dynamically in seven
node-based/region-based operations. The seven operations are update, join, leave,
merge, partition, expansion, and contraction.
These operations are designed based on the following rules:
1. All leaves in the hierarchy of AKM are real nodes. Each real node i has its own
secret key SKi, and PKi = g
SKi mod p, where g is a random generator.
2. The non-leaf nodes are virtual nodes, and their secret keys are generated di-
rectly/indirectly from real nodes through some region-based operations.
3. A tree with node A as root is called RegionA. For example, region A has
virtual nodes B1, B2, and real nodes C1,1, C1,2, C1,3, C2,1, C2,2, C2,3, and C2,4.
The number of the nodes that know the secret of region is Overall Region Size
(ORS).
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4. The Regional Trust Coefficient (RTC) is the ratio of the threshold to ORS, and
indicates how secure the region is. The AKM sets a Global Trust Coefficient
(GTC) as a lower bound of all the RTC. Figure 1 shows an example, in which
the ORS is 4 and RTC is 0.75 of the region B2. The GTC of region A would
be 0.2.
3.1 Function Update
Function update prevents any intruders from compromising the secret, and the AKM
updates keys periodically. First, the region with (n, t)-threshold must select t nodes
and each node is indicated as node i ∈ 1, . . . , t.
Each node i generates update share Si,j(1 ≤ j ≤ n) of key 0. The node i selects
random numbers xj(1 ≤ j ≤ n) and rd(1 ≤ d ≤ i − 1) to compute coefficients
ad = (rd|0)(1 ≤ d ≤ t − 1). Si,j = a(xj =
∑t−1
r=0 ar(xj)
r (mod p), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Node i then distributes Si,j to node j ∈ 1, . . . , n. When node j receives the update
shares distributed from other t nodes in the region, it computes a new share




Si,j (mod p). (1)
The previous section describes how AKM can manage its secret sharing hierarchical
structure using seven region-based functions. These operations cover all possible
region changes from node joining to leaving. The key update frequency in MANET
is adjustable depending on the application environment. If the frequency is high,
the MANET would be secure enough against adversaries, but would result in lower
performance and heavy power consumption. On the contrary, if the frequency is
low, the communication between nodes in MANET suffers from key inconsistency
after many nodes join and leave continuously.
3.2 Function Join
Function Join is used when a node i wants to join a (t, n)-threshold region. The
node sends a request to node j ∈ 1, . . . , t in the region. Upon receiving the request,
node j checks its certificate revoking list (CRL) first. If node j accepts the request,
it computes a partial share S ′j of node i:












σ(j − r) · Sj,r (3)
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1, x > 0
−1, x < 0
0, otherwise













∆j (mod q). (4)
3.3 Function Leave
Function Leave is used when a node leaves a region. Any node j removes the
certificate of node i from its key management records when receiving a leave request
from node i or detecting the node leaves. The share key of node j does not change
until the AKM updates key periodically.
3.4 Function Merge
Function Merge is used when the number of nodes in a region is below the threshold.
The region is simply divided into many parts and they join to the other sibling
regions respectively. As in Algorithm 1, AKM performs Function Merge on region Si
and merges its nodes Si,1 to Si,r into regions Sj and Sk as Sj,(n+1), . . . , Sj,(n+p) and
Sk,(n+1), . . . , Sk,(n+q).
Algorithm 1 Merge
Require: The merged region Si which contains nodes Si,1, · · · , Si,r, and the desti-
nation t regions SD0 , SD1, · · · , SDt−1.
Ensure: Region SD0 , SD1, · · · , SDt−1.




⌉+1, · · · , Si,2⌈ r
t
⌉],
· · · , [Si,(t−2)⌈ r
t




⌉+1, · · · , Si,r].
2: for u = 0 to t− 2 do
3: for v = 1 to ⌈ r
t
⌉ do





7: for v = 1 to r − t⌊ r
t
⌋ do
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3.5 Function Partition
Function Partition is used when the RTC of a region is under the GTC. For
example, Figure 3 shows that AKM partitions region Si with 2n nodes into Si and
S(m+1) with the same size n under threshold k. To assign the secret share to the
nodes in S(m+1), it first randomly selects t regions from S1 to Sm and randomly
chooses t nodes {Sj,1, · · · , Sj,t} from each Sj region. Second, it creates a new node





























Sj,vlj,v(0)lj(IDSi) (mod q). (8)








Sj,vlj,v(0)lj(IDSm+i) (mod q). (9)
To generate each share S(m+1),j(1 ≤ j ≤ n) of regions S(m+1), S
′
(m+1),v, where
S ′(m+1),v = S(m+1),vl(m+1),v(0)Rm+1 (mod q), (10)
R(m+1) = l(m+1)(IDSm+1)− lj(IDSi). (11)
3.6 Function Expansion
Function Expansion is used when the RTC of a region is under the GTC. AKM
must perform expansion operation to extend the hierarchy when the RTCs are under
or equal to GTC in all the AKM regions. The function ensures that all the RTCs of
regions are not lower than GTC when nodes increase continuously. Figure 4 shows
that AKM extends region Si from one level to two levels with the same threshold.
It selects t nodes in region Si, and executes function join to create a new node













...Si,1 Si,(2n) Si,1 Si,n S(m+1),1 S(m+1),n
Fig. 3. Function Partition – partition of Si into Sj and Sm+1
Si,(n+1). It then moves Si,1, . . . , Si,m to be Si,(n+1)’s children, Si,(n+1),1, . . . , Si,(n+1),m
with shares Si,(n+1),j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, that





r (mod q) (12)
where ar = rr|sr(1 ≤ r ≤ t), Si,(n+1) = stst−1 . . . s1, and all rrs are the same used in
























Fig. 4. Function Expansion
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3.7 Function Contraction
Function Contraction is the opposite of function Expansion. This function is used
when the number of nodes is less than the threshold in the region. The function
merges the nodes contained in the contracted region into the other regions whose
RTCs are less than GTC and decreases the level of AKM. As in Algorithm 2, AKM
performs Function Contraction on region Si,(m+1) and merges its nodes Si,(m+1),1 to
Si,(m+1),r into regions Si and Sj as Si,(m+1), . . . , Si,(m+p) and Sj,(n+1), . . . , Sj,(n+q).
Algorithm 2 Contraction
Require: Region Si which contains nodes Si,1, · · · , Si,r.
Ensure: Region SD0 , SD1, · · · , SDt−1.
1: Merge Si into {SD0 , SD1, · · · , SDt−1}
2: if Si /∈ {SD0 , SD1, · · · , SDt−1 then
3: Delete Si
4: end if
The seven-region-based operations on MANET of modified AKM handle key
management. The scheme needs a trusted authority (TA) to start up, neither any
central authorities to compute and distribute shares.
4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section discusses the performance improvement of the proposed method in
terms of communication cost and computation cost. The modified AKM inherits
the AKM structure, and transmissions between each node are (update) shares. Thus,
the single message discussion must be transmitted with significant information.
The length of secret key k, protected by the secret sharing scheme, must be
long enough for some security issues (i.e., 2 048 bits or more). In Shamir’s secret




j + k, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is bounded by |k|. For example, if |k| = 2 048
bits long, the length of each share is at least 2 048 bits. However, the modified
secret sharing scheme reduces share length to 1
t
without security loss. The secret




of |k| on appropriate prime number p. Therefore, the modified MANET
communication cost can be reduced to 1
t
.
Message (Share) length size
AKM |yi| = |k| ≤ |p|
Modified AKM |yi| =
|k|
t
≤ |k| ≤ |p|
Table 1. Message length comparison
Computation cost on the MANET environment is a very important issue. Cer-
tain mobile ad-hoc devices have restricted power, and cannot support jobs requiring
Modified Autonomous Key Management Scheme with Reduced Costs in MANET 1177
heavy computation cost. The proposed improvement also influences computation
cost. Finding that the critical mathematical operation is module multiplication (/di-
vision) in all operations is easy, depending on operand length. Almost all operands
in modified AKM reduce, resulting from each modified AKM share as 1
t
faster than




AKM |yi| = |k| ≤ |p|
Modified AKM |yi| =
|k|
t
≤ |k| ≤ |p|
Table 2. Operand length comparison
5 CONCLUSION
The security of mobile ad hoc networks influences their applications. To achieve the
sufficient security, autonomous key management for large number nodes is an im-
portant issue. This paper proposes the modified AKM to reduce the communication
cost and computation cost to 1
t
of the original cost without security loss. Results
show that the modified AKM is more practical because it can handle huge numbers
of dynamic nodes in a MANET while meeting sufficient security requirements. The
proposed methodology can be applied to all the schemes based on a cryptographic
threshold scheme to truncate message size without endangering security.
Further research on this topic will attempt to simplify the computation com-
plexity of some AKM operations for the workability of ad hoc devices. Furthermore,
we will apply the proposed concept on to a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) be-
cause the environment of VANET is more dynamic and the topology changes faster,
resulting in narrower bandwith.
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